Credit Suisse Group AG

CS as Greensill FUND-PACKAGER: CS launched & managed 4 supply-chain-finance funds (2017, ~$10B AUM) that BOUGHT Greensill's notes — but Greensill itself selected the claims and arranged its own insurance; CS had 'little knowledge and control' (FINMA). CS, not SoftBank, was the structurer of the offload vehicle.

FACT (FINMA primary, 28 Feb 2023): From 2017 Credit Suisse launched four supply-chain-finance (SCF) funds 'in collaboration with Greensill'; CS acted as ASSET MANAGER, distributing securities backed by SCF claims to qualified investors, ~$10B invested at the Mar-2021 closure with risk 'indicated as low'. FINMA found CS's asset-mgmt company 'had little knowledge and control over the specific claims' — GREENSILL ITSELF (not CS) selected/reviewed the actual claims, and CS 'left it to [Greensill] to arrange the insurance cover in its own name'. CS made 'partly false and overly positive statements' to regulators re claims selection. FINMA ordered CS to review ~500 major relationships at board level + document ~600 senior managers, and opened 4 enforcement proceedings vs former CS managers. STRUCTURING ROLE: this is the packaging engine — CS built and badged the fund wrapper that converted Greensill paper into 'low risk' notes for outside investors. BASE-RATE CAVEAT: CS was the era's dominant structured-products house, so its appearance as packager is partly selection effect, not necessarily intent. Dup-guard: collapse mechanics already in #11548-11558.

CS as Wirecard RISK-SPREADER: CS arranged the Oct-2019 'CB arb' that repackaged SoftBank's EUR900M Wirecard convertible into exchangeable notes (Argentum SPV; 1.9% coupon, EUR130 strike) and SOLD the credit risk to outside institutions — recovering SoftBank/Mubadala/insiders' principal at ~zero net capital. CS was the distribution channel, not the brains.

FACT: Sept/Oct 2019, one day after SoftBank signed the Wirecard tie-up, CS arranged sale of EUR900M notes EXCHANGEABLE into Wirecard shares via SPV Argentum Netherlands BV (#4291), collateralized by SoftBank's original convertible. Terms: 1.9% annual coupon, conversion strike EUR130. GlobalCapital called it a 'startling CB arb'/'structured equity' trade. MECHANIC (Bloomberg/finews): the convertible was 'first sold to Mubadala and a few SoftBank executives, incl Misra and Naheta, at generous prices and then immediately re-packaged and re-sold by Credit Suisse to a broader group of investors at substantially less attractive terms. Mubadala et al ended up getting Wirecard stakes — risk-free and for nothing.' KEY NUANCE: 'The loans were structured by SoftBank's former investment bankers and sold to institutional investors — via Credit Suisse' (finews). So the STRUCTURING brains were Misra/Naheta's ex-Deutsche-Bank team; CS was the risk-spreading CONDUIT 'on the hook for spreading risk to a wider public'. When Wirecard collapsed (Jun 2020) the notes fell to ~13.5c and outside bondholders bore the loss (Dutch auction Jul 2020). Dup-guard: #11606-11609 cover the deal + Argentum; this adds CS's specific arranger economics + the structurer-vs-conduit distinction. BASE-RATE CAVEAT: CB-arb repackaging via SPV is standard equity-linked desk product.

CS's DEMISE — SoftBank losses contributed: CS's Mar-2023 collapse / CHF3B UBS takeover was proximately caused by Greensill ($10B funds frozen) + Archegos ($4.7B+). The SoftBank-Greensill nexus was thus a DIRECT contributor. And CS LOST its $440M Greensill/Katerra claim vs SoftBank entirely (Virtuoso v SoftBank [2025] EWHC 2631, Lord Justice Miles, 15 Oct 2025) — the bag-holder got no recovery.

FACT: On 19 Mar 2023 the Swiss Federal Council/SNB/FINMA brokered UBS's takeover of CS for CHF3B (~$3.2B) all-stock, with CHF100B+ SNB liquidity + a CHF9B government loss guarantee; completed 12 Jun 2023. Proximate causes (Bloomberg/CEPR/swissinfo): Archegos (CS's losses ≥$4.7B, Mar 2021) + Greensill (the $10B SCF funds frozen 1 Mar 2021, ~$2.3-3B investor losses). Both detonated the SAME WEEK in March 2021 and began the reputational/risk-mgmt spiral that ended two years later. THE SOFTBANK LINK TO CS'S DEATH: SoftBank was the largest single name across the frozen Greensill funds' exposures (4 of top-5; Katerra etc.), so the SoftBank-Greensill circular nexus is a direct contributor to the Greensill leg of CS's demise. POSTSCRIPT — CS got NOTHING: as successor-in-interest, Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF sued SoftBank under s.423 Insolvency Act 1986 for the $440M Katerra/Greensill loss; after a 5-week 2025 trial, the UK High Court ([2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch), Lord Justice Miles, judgment 15 Oct 2025) DISMISSED the claim in full — SoftBank acted in good faith, did not know/suspect Greensill would prejudice creditors, and 'positively believed' Greensill had already used the $440M to make CS whole. Charles Russell Speechlys: 'pyrrhic victory for Credit Suisse — no relief granted.' So the structurer/distributor absorbed the loss with no legal recourse. Dup-guard: collapse mechanics in #11556; this adds CS-demise causation + the final 2025 judgment outcome.

VERDICT — CS is the COMMON OFFLOAD CONDUIT, not the architect: same bank packaged & sold the risk on BOTH SoftBank bag-passes (Wirecard Argentum 2019; Greensill SCF funds), plus Lombard-lent to Son personally & shared Gulf shareholders (Mubadala/Olayan). But the STRUCTURING brains were SoftBank's own ex-Deutsche-Bank team (Misra/Naheta) — CS was the distribution channel that ended up holding the bag.

SYNTHESIS across this pass: CREDIT SUISSE recurs as the risk-OFFLOAD conduit on two distinct SoftBank/Misra fraud-adjacent deals: (1) WIRECARD — arranged the Argentum CB-arb that resold insiders' convertible to outside bondholders (#11628); (2) GREENSILL — built/managed the 4 SCF funds (~$10B) that bought Greensill paper and into which SoftBank invested-then-redeemed (#11626, #11553). THREE FURTHER CS-SoftBank vectors: (a) CS was a Lombard lender to Masayoshi Son personally (alongside Julius Baer, Safra Sarasin, LGT; Son pledged ~40% of his stake across 19 managers); (b) shared anchor shareholders — Saudi PIF/Olayan (CS's longest-standing holders) and Mubadala (jointly ran a CS infra fund to 2017) overlap SoftBank's Gulf backers; (c) CS advised SoftBank on the Wirecard deal itself. VERDICT: CS IS the common bag-pass engineer in the narrow sense (same packager/distributor twice), and on BOTH deals CS — not the outside investors' counterparties — was structurally positioned to eat residual risk (it lost ~$2.3-3B on Greensill funds and $440M on Katerra notes; the Wirecard notes it placed cratered). CRUCIAL NUANCE / against the 'CS is the architect' reading: the STRUCTURING intelligence was SoftBank's OWN ex-Deutsche-Bank credit-desk diaspora (Misra ran DB global credit/securitization; Naheta ex-DB prop — cf #11586, #11588, #11619). finews: 'loans structured by SoftBank's former investment bankers and sold via Credit Suisse.' So Misra/Naheta are NOT ex-CS; CS was the go-to EXTERNAL packaging/distribution counterparty, not their alma mater. BASE-RATE CAVEAT (load-bearing): CS was the dominant structured-products & SCF-fund house of the 2017-2021 era and banker-to-the-Gulf-sovereigns; any large structured SoftBank trade would plausibly route through CS regardless of intent. The pattern is real and the common-conduit fact is solid, but 'CS engineered the frauds' overreaches the evidence — CS was the willing, conflicted, ultimately bag-holding distributor. CS's own Mar-2023 collapse/UBS takeover was driven by Greensill ($10B) + Archegos ($4.7B+); the SoftBank-Greensill loss was thus a DIRECT contributor to CS's demise (#11630).